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TIGER WOODS LOSES AT AUGUSTA:
COURTS SAY: "RICK RUSH GETS THE GREEN JACKET"
ETW CORP V. JIREH PUBLISHING, INC.
Matt Link
INTRODUCTION
This note discusses the court's decision in ETW Corp., v. Jireh Publishing, Inc. [EN 1]. In
ETW, Tiger Woods attempted to stop an artist from selling prints portraying him golfing in the
Masters Tournament. Woods' claims were based on trademark law and his right of publicity. The
court dismissed his trademark infringement claims ruling that Woods had not exhibited a
trademark in the particular image used in defendant's prints. However, this note will primarily
focus on the courts rationale regarding Woods' right of publicity claim. The court concluded that
defendant's prints merited First Amendment protection because they were neither sports
merchandise nor commercial speech [EN 2]. Based on this conclusion, the court ruled that
Woods' publicity right claim failed.
This note argues that although the court was correct to rule in favor of defendant, it
applied faulty analysis. This note also suggests that the ETW decision sets an undesirable
precedent for future publicity right claims. Part I describes ETW and its rationale. Part II first
discusses why ETW's analysis was wrong. It then presents the proper test for analyzing publicity
right claims in these circumstances. Finally, Part II applies the balancing test to ETW and
concludes that Woods' claim still should fail.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, ETW Corp., sued Jireh Publishing, Inc. in a trademark infringement case. ETW
is the exclusive licensing agent of Tiger Woods. Jireh is a publishing company and the exclusive
publisher of sports artist Rick Rush [EN 3]. In 1998, ETW received registration for the
trademark "TIGER WOODS" from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office [EN 4]. The case arose
after Rick Rush created a print of Tiger Woods entitled "The Masters of Augusta" without
Woods' consent. The print features Tiger Woods swinging in the center flanked by his caddie
and his playing partner's caddie [EN 5]. Only 5,000 of Rush's prints were available worldwide.
The parties agreed on the notoriety of Tiger Woods [EN 6].
ETW filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. ETW's
complaint asserted six claims. Counts One through Five were based on the premise that Jireh had
infringed upon ETW's trademark of Tiger Woods. Count Six alleged that Jireh violated Tiger
Woods' right of publicity in violation of Ohio common law [EN 7]. Both parties moved for
summary and partial judgment on the issues of freedom of speech and expression, lack of
customer confusion, and likelihood of confusion [EN 8]. The court granted defendant's motions
for summary judgment and the plaintiffs motions were denied. As a result, judgment was
entered for the defendant.
The court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to establish the validity of its claim to the
trademark rights in the image of Tiger Woods. Although plaintiff had received registration for
the trademark "TIGER WOODS," plaintiff did not "demonstrate that it use[d] the image of Tiger
Woods, which is used in the defendant's print as a trademark, i.e., an identification source" [EN
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9]. As a result, the court concluded that plaintiffs trademark infringement claims, counts One
though Five, failed.
However, the focus of this note is on the court's conclusion and reasoning concerning
plaintiffs sixth count. Count Six alleged violation of Tiger Woods' right of publicity in violation
of Ohio common law [EN 10]. The court dismissed this claim based strictly on its conclusion
that defendant's print was an artistic creation seeking to express a message, and was protected by
the First Amendment [EN 11].
The court recognized that Ohio common law protects the right of publicity. The court
pointed out that "the right of publicity protects the celebrity's pecuniary interest in the
commercial exploitation of his identity" [EN 12]. However, the court went on to point out that
the right of publicity is limited by the First Amendment [EN 13]. The court explained that "the
right of publicity does not authorize a celebrity to prevent the use of her name in an expressive
work protected by the First Amendment" [EN 14]. As a result, the court's conclusion focused on
whether defendant's print deserved First Amendment protection.
The court began by dismissing plaintiffs argument that defendant's prints were merely
sports merchandise and not entitled to First Amendment protection. The court distinguished its
case from preceding cases where courts denied First Amendment protection to posters. The court
first distinguished its case from Factors Etc., Inc. v. ProArts. Inc.[EN 15]. In Factors, the court
ruled against a defendant who published a poster entitled "In Memory" using a copyrighted
photograph of Elvis. ETW argued that the "defendant's artistic prints seeking to convey a
message may be distinguished from posters which merely reproduce an existing photograph"
[EN 16].
Similarly, the court distinguished its case from Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v.
Scoreboard Posters [EN 17]. In Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, the court ruled against the
defendant, which produced a poster that intentionally parodied another copyrighted poster.
Defendant's poster featured partially nude ex-Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders wearing nearly
identical outfits to those in the original poster. There, the court argued that "free expression is
enriched by protecting the creations of authors from exploitation by others" [EN 18]. The court
in ETW distinguished itself from that case by first stressing that the claim before it involved the
right of publicity and not copyright. Also, the court argued that it was not faced with an instance
of mere copying of an idea but with a unique expression of an idea [EN 19].
The court next concluded that plaintiffs prints were not commercial speech, which would
merit limited First Amendment protection. The court ruled that paintings and drawings are fully
protected by the First Amendment [EN 20]. The court concluded that the prints were artistic
creations seeking to express a message. The court focused on the fact that the prints were done
by Rick Rush who characterized himself as "America's Sporting Artist - Painting America
through Sports" [EN 21]. It focused on Rush's narrative that was included with the print. It stated
what he wished to express through his art: "As man is valuable, so is what man does, and sports -
perhaps more than other activities - reminds us of life's best moments and its brevity in the same
instance" [EN 22]. The court concluded that the Supreme Court would find such expression to
fall within the ambit of the First Amendment. It pointed out that "visual art is as wide ranging in
its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or other writing,
and is similarly entitled to full First Amendment protection" [EN 23].
Consequently, the court concluded that defendant's prints were neither commercial
speech nor sports merchandise. As a result, the court ruled that defendant's prints deserved First
Amendment protection and plaintiffs publicity claim failed.
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II. ANALYSIS
This section of the note argues that although the court ruled correctly in ETW, it applied
the wrong test. This section will first critique the test used by the court. It will then present the
proper balancing test for analyzing publicity right claims. Finally, this section will explain that
applying the balancing test would yield the same result.
A. THE ETW DECISION APPLIED THE WRONG TEST
The court's analysis regarding plaintiffs publicity right claim focused on whether
defendant's print was sports merchandise or commercial speech. Once the court determined that
defendant's print deserved First Amendment protection, it concluded that plaintiffs publicity
right claim failed. This conclusion is flawed for two main reasons. First, the court failed to
recognize the importance of publicity rights. It wrongly assumed that the state's interest in
protecting First Amendment values automatically trumps the state's interest in protecting
publicity rights.
There are strong policy reasons for protecting publicity rights. Morally speaking, an
image created by an individual that has an associative value ought to be protected from "free
riders." "The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the straightforward one of
preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of goodwill. No social purpose is served by having the
defendant get some free aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he
would normally pay" [EN 24]. Therefore, society should not implicitly send the message that
people are encouraged to get something for nothing. It would discourage people from working
hard to produce uniquely creative works.
Similarly, there are economic reasons for protecting one's publicity rights. The right of
publicity is "not a right of censorship, but a right to prevent others from misappropriating the
economic value generated by the celebrity's fame though the merchandising of the 'name, voice,
signature, photograph or likeness of the celebrity" [EN 25]. Protecting people's economic
interests in their identities fosters creativity. If the law protects the value created by people's
efforts, they will be encouraged to partake in socially useful tasks. As a result, the court failed to
attach sufficient weight to publicity rights when it implied that all First Amendment interests
trump publicity rights.
Secondly, the court's reasoning is flawed because it ended its analysis once it determined
that defendant's prints were "seeking to express a message" [EN 26]. The court reasoned that
defendant's prints were neither sports merchandise nor commercial speech. Therefore, the court
concluded that "it appears that the United States Supreme Court would find such expression to
fall within the ambit of the First Amendment" [EN 27]. However, the court's analysis should not
have ended there. The court's holding sends the message that any work of art, however much it
trespasses on the right of publicity and however much it lacks additional creative elements, is
categorically shielded from liability by the First Amendment [EN 28].
Following the court's analysis in subsequent cases could produce troublesome results.
The court's conclusion suggests that all non-commercial works deserving First Amendment
protection are immune from publicity right claims. However, the implication of this rule is that
individuals may unfairly exploit a celebrity's image by claiming that their work is expressive
although they essentially used the celebrity's image for commercial purposes. The court failed to
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foresee instances when society's interest in applying First Amendment protection to particular
works would be minimal and outweighed by another's publicity rights.
It is true that courts have awarded First Amendment protection to a wide array of
expressions. The fact that expression takes a form of nonverbal, visual representation does not
remove it from the ambit of First Amendment protection [EN 29]. Moreover, "the United States
Supreme Court has made it clear that a work of art is protected by the First Amendment even if it
conveys no discernable message" [EN 30]. Therefore, it is evident that much expression will
merit some level of First Amendment protection. However, this should not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the interest in defending First Amendment rights always trumps society's interest
in enforcing publicity rights.
B. THE PROPER TEST IS A BALANCING TEST
The ETW court should have implemented a balancing test in its analysis. The proper test
for balancing property rights against First Amendment rights was implemented in Comedy III
Productions Inc. v. Gary Saderup Inc. [EN 31]. In that case, the court ruled that defendant
violated plaintiffs publicity rights when he sold lithographs and t-shirts bearing a likeness of The
Three Stooges reproduced from a charcoal drawing he had made [EN 32]. The court
acknowledged that defendant's portraits of The Three Stooges were expressive works and not an
advertisement for or endorsement of a product [EN 33]. Similarly, the court acknowledged that
defendant's creations do not lose constitutional protections because they are for purposes of
entertaining rather than informing. Additionally, the court stated the fact that defendant's art
appeared on t-shirts did not reduce First Amendment protection [EN 34]. However, the court
continued, "having recognized the high degree of First Amendment protection for
noncommercial speech about celebrities, we need not conclude that all expression that trenches
on the right of publicity receives such protection" [EN 35].
The court suggested a test in which publicity rights would be balanced against First
Amendment concerns. In formulating its test, the court considered similar preceding cases. In
Estate of Presley v. Russen, [EN 36] the court dismissed defendant's First Amendment defense
regarding his Elvis impersonation act. There the court reasoned that the "recognition that
defendant's production has some value does not diminish our conclusion that the primary
purpose of defendant's activity is to appropriate the commercial value of the likeness of Elvis
Presley" [EN 37].
The Comedy III Productions Inc. decision also relied on the court's analysis in Groucho
Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co. [EN 38]. There the court rejected a First Amendment
defense to defendant's production of a play featuring characters resembling the Marx Brothers. In
analyzing the defense, the court posed a dichotomy between "works.. .designed primarily to
promote the dissemination of thoughts, ideas or information through news or fictionalization,"
which would receive First Amendment protection, and "use of the celebrity's name or
likeness... largely for commercial purposes, such as the sale of merchandise," in which the right
of publicity would prevail [EN 39].
After recognizing that First Amendment protections may be limited by publicity rights,
the court discussed how to distinguish between protected and unprotected expression. The court
adopted a version of the copyright law's fair use test by focusing on whether and to what extent
the new work is transformative. The court stated that "this inquiry into whether a work is
'transformative' appears to us to be necessarily at the heart of any judicial attempt to square the
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right of publicity with the First Amendment" [EN 40]. "When artistic expression takes the form
of a literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on the
right of publicity without adding significant expression beyond that trespass, the state law
interest in protecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the expressive interest of the imitative
artist" [EN 41].
The transformative test determines "whether a product containing a celebrity's likeness is
so transformed that it has become primarily the defendant's own expression rather than the
celebrity's likeness" [EN 42]. The court stressed that "when an artist's skill and talent is
manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of a celebrity so as
to commercially exploit his or her fame, then the artist's right of free expression is outweighed by
the right of publicity" [EN 43]. In applying the balancing test, courts should not be concerned
with the quality of the artistic expression. Rather the inquiry is more "quantitative than
qualitative, asking whether the literal and imitative or the creative elements predominate in the
work" [EN 44].
This balancing test would best protect publicity rights without chilling expressive speech
that disseminates valuable thoughts and ideas. The test prevents individuals from
misappropriating the economic value generated by a celebrity's fame through the merchandising
of the name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness of the celebrity [EN 45]. Celebrities and
athletes such as Tiger Woods work hard to both become successful at their trade and to create
favorable public images. The economic value attached to their images should be adequately
protected against unauthorized exploitation.
The fact that some legislatures have enacted publicity right statutes reflects society's
interest in protecting intellectual property from unauthorized exploitation. In ETW, the plaintiffs
publicity right claim was based on common law. That publicity rights originate in common law
and statutes should not necessarily subordinate them to First Amendment rights. An amici curiae
brief in support of the ETW defendant argued, "the right of publicity is merely a narrow
limitation that applies to false and misleading advertisements" [EN 46]. This is untrue because
the rationale for publicity rights is more expansive. Publicity rights are interested in protecting
individuals from having the fruits of their labor unfairly exploited by others for purely economic
purposes. Furthermore, the state has a legitimate interest in protecting unauthorized exploitation
of another's image. The reality is that this right can potentially conflict with the First
Amendment. Protecting publicity rights can potentially frustrate freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. Balancing the two interests is the sensible
method of resolving the conflict.
The balancing test would not significantly restrict First Amendment rights. The court
would not be forced to evaluate the expressive value of a work to determine whether and to what
extent a work is transfomative. Rather, courts could quantitatively determine whether the author
added significant elements to the celebrity's image. Furthermore, the balancing test would not
give a celebrity the right to absolutely control his/her image by censoring disagreeable
portrayals. Rather, the right of publicity is essentially an economic right [EN 47]. Its application
would be limited to instances where defendants misappropriate the economic value generated by
a celebrity's fame by distributing insufficiently transformative works.
It would be unwise to conclude that all expression that trenches on the right of publicity
receives First Amendment protection. That conclusion would significantly dilute the potency of
publicity rights. Individuals should not be allowed to hide behind the First Amendment when
their work's marketability and economic value derives primarily from the celebrity depicted. This
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would allow people to unfairly exploit another's image by adding minimal creative effort to their
work. Therefore, the proper analysis should balance the First Amendment with publicity rights
by determining whether a work is sufficiently transformative. A sufficiently expressive work
"must contribute something more than a merely trivial variation, but must create something
recognizably his own" [EN 48].
C. APPLYING THE BALANCING TEST TO ETW
This note has critiqued the analytical framework used by the court in ETW. However, the
court came to the proper conclusion. In applying the balancing test to ETW, it is evident that
defendant's prints deserve First Amendment protection.
The items at issue are prints of paintings done by Rick Rush, who characterizes himself
as "America's Sporting Artist - Painting America through Sports" [EN 49]. Rush's print portrays
Tiger Woods, his caddie and his playing partner's caddie. Plaintiffs prints are not commercial
speech; they are not an advertisement for or endorsement of a product. Rather, they are
expressive works that are entitled to full First Amendment protection. Additionally, although the
prints were done for financial gain, "the First Amendment is not limited to those who publish
without charge" [EN 50]. Therefore, it is necessary to balance the First Amendment with
plaintiffs publicity rights.
It cannot be said that the interest in defending plaintiffs publicity rights outweighs the
value of defendant's free expression. The balancing test demands that the court determine
whether and to what extent the defendant's work is transformative. Defendant's prints contain a
creative expressive element, which supports the conclusion they are sufficiently transformative.
First, defendant's works are sufficiently transformative because Rush used them to
convey a particular message. Defendant's prints are the type of works "designed primarily to
promote the dissemination of thoughts, ideas or information," which would receive First
Amendment protection [EN 51]. Defendant's prints reminded people of Woods' skill, focus,
determination and sportsmanship that led to his victory at Augusta. Rush's creations were
different from those considered in Comedy III Productions Inc.. In Comedy III Productions Inc.,
defendant merely reproduced the likenesses of The Three Stooges on t-shirts, while conveying
no discernable message. In ETW, however, the defendant uniquely portrayed Tiger Woods as he
triumphantly conquered Augusta. The title of the print is "The Masters of Augusta," which
strengthens defendant's argument that the prints "express the majesty of a newsworthy moment"
[EN 52]. Furthermore, Rush included a narrative with the prints that explained what he wished to
express. Rush stressed that sports "reminds us of life's best moments and its brevity in the same
instance" [EN 53]. Therefore, Rush's print does more that merely reproduce Woods' image to sell
his work. Woods' image was used to express a transcendent message of sports' significance in
society.
Secondly, defendant used Woods' image only as one of the raw materials to create the
prints. The prints are not merely literal depictions of Woods. Rather, they are artistic creations
expressing the "majesty of the moment" when Woods played in the Masters Tournament at
Augusta [EN 54]. Rush added his own creative instinct to formulate a work that conveyed the
brilliance of Woods' performance at Augusta. Rush's prints have uniquely become his own even
though they utilize Tiger Woods' image. Rush's expressed his view that Tiger Woods' presence at
Augusta was of great significance to the sporting world. The prints have a meaning exceeding
that which could be achieved by a mere literal depiction of Woods.
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Furthermore, the marketability and economic value of the prints do not derive primarily
from Woods. Rather, several other factors increased the marketability and economic value of the
prints. Rush expected his authorship to increase public demand for the prints. He describes
himself as "America's Sporting Artist - Painting America through Sports" thereby elevating the
importance of works creating by him. Rush treats himself as a serious artist claiming that he
wants to "give America serious art" on sports subjects. Similarly, the prints contained a limited
edition certificate verifying that only 5,000 were available worldwide. These facts indicate that
the prints are not merely simple reproductions of Woods that depend primarily on his image for
value and marketability. Rather, Rush considers himself a reputable artist whose unique
expression of sporting subjects creates independent value.
Therefore, in applying the balancing test to ETW, it is evident that the plaintiffs publicity
interests do not outweigh the value of defendant's free expression. This is not one of those
circumstances where the primary purpose of a defendant's activity is to appropriate the
commercial value of a celebrity. Rather, defendant's prints add significant transformative
elements to Woods' image that made the prints uniquely his own creation.
III. CONCLUSION
Although this note concludes that the value of defendant's free expression outweighs
plaintiffs publicity rights, one should not underestimate the danger of strictly applying ETW's
analysis. ETW's apparent holding, that any work of art, however much it lacks additional
creative elements, [EN 55] is categorically shielded from liability by the First Amendment,
would produce undesirable results in future cases. It encourages people to copy rather than
create. Furthermore, it trivializes society's interest in preventing people from misappropriating
economic value earned by others.
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